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CASENOTE
Fisher v. Gala: O.C.GA. § 9-11-9.1(e) Keeping
Malpractice Claims Afloat

I.

INTRODUCTION

'If at first you don't succeed, Try, try again."
Thomas H. Palmer'
For over four decades, the Georgia General Assembly has sought to
strike a balance between the need for competent medical care and the
role of the judiciary in determining relief for those injured by improper
medical treatment.' In its effort, Georgia adopted measures to limit the
number of frivolous lawsuits to protect its professionals while giving
plaintiffs an efficient avenue for relief. One of these adopted measures
is the Official Code of Georgia Annotated's (O.C.G.A.) expert affidavit
requirement, section 9-11-9.1 (§ 9.1).1 The use of expert testimony in
malpractice cases is "firmly entrenched" in Georgia's policy and crucial
4
to professional malpractice claims. Section 9.1 requires plaintiffs to
submit an expert affidavit contemporaneously with the complaint in
malpractice actions.5 The Georgia Court of Appeals determined in
Fisherv. Gala' that, pursuant to the language of § 9.1(e), a plaintiff has
the ability to cure an affidavit that is defective because of the expert's
7
Fisher,
incompetency by amendment with a substitute affidavit.

1. THOMAS H. PALMER, THE TEACHER'S MANUAL: AN EXPOSITION OF AN EFFICIENT AND
ECONOMICAL SYSTEM OF EDUCATION SUITED TO THE WANTS OF A FREE PEOPLE 223 (1840).

2. See, e.g. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 286 Ga. 731, 732, 733-34,
691 S.E.2d 218, 221-22 (2010) (discussing the history of medical malpractice actions).
3. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (2014).
4. CHARLES R. ADAMS III, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTS § 5:2 (2012-2013 ed.).
5. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(a).
6.

325 Ga. App. 800, 754 S.E.2d 160 (2014), cert. granted sub nom Gala v. Fisher, No.

$14G0919, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 455 (June 2, 2014).
7. Id. at 804-05, 754 S.E.2d at 164.
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therefore, embodies Thomas Palmer's American maxim8 within the
realm of medical malpractice. Georgia plaintiffs: If your first expert
affiant is found incompetent, amend and try again with a different one.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Dorian Fisher received medical treatment after he suffered a back
injury in March 2010. After initial diagnostic testing, Mr. Fisher's
treating physicians found a possible tumor in his spinal cord.9 Mr.
Fisher then pursued a second opinion from physician Vishal Gala, M.D.
Dr. Gala diagnosed Mr. Fisher with an intradural spinal cord tumor, as
had the original treating physicians. Dr. Gala specified that the tumor
was a benign one called a schwannoma.' ° Dr. Gala then suggested that
Mr. Fisher's treatment should include a laminectomy, a surgery to
remove the tumor, at the lower level of Mr. Fisher's spine." Specifically, the surgery would occur at the L5-S1 level of Mr. Fisher's spine. Mr.
Fisher agreed to have the laminectomy surgery to remove the schwannoma. Dr. Gala and Regis Haid, M.D., both neurosurgeons, performed the
laminectomy surgery on July 13, 2010.12
After the surgery, Mr. Fisher alleged, the laminectomy showed no
schwannoma at the lower level of his spine. Dr. Gala and Dr. Haid did,
however, find "a bundle of clumping nerve roots consistent with [the
condition] arachnoiditis. " 13 After this discovery, the neurosurgeons

8. See supra note 1.
9. Fisher, 325 Ga. App. at 800, 754 S.E.2d at 161. This tumor was thought to be an
intradural spinal cord tumor. Id. An intradural tumor means that the mass is "Iwlithin
or enclosed by the dura mater." THOMAS STEDMAN, STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 916
(27th ed. 2000). The dura mater of the spinal cord is a single-layered strong membrane
that covers the central nervous system. Id. at 548.
10. Fisher, 325 Ga. App. at 800-01, 754 S.E.2d at 161. A schwannoma is a benign
tumor made up of Schwann cells that grows on the outside of the nerve. STEDMAN, supra

note 9, at 1602.
11. Fisher,325 Ga. App. at 801, 754 S.E.2d at 161; see also STEDMAN, supra note 9, at
964 (defining laminectomy). For a diagram of the different spinal cord levels, see
STEDMAN, supra note 9, at 1882.

12. Fisher,325 Ga. App at 800, 801, 754 S.E.2d at 161. To understand Mr. Fisher's
need for surgery, note that a suspected schwannoma, though benign, must be removed.
LOUISE J. GORDY & ROSCOE N. GRAY, 5 ATTORNEY's TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 15.54 (3rd

ed. 2010). The tumor grows "at the expense of healthy organism[s]." Id. Typically, once
a benign tumor has been surgically taken out it does not return. Id. Their existence
presents a significant danger when they are in the spinal column because the central
nervous system occupies most of this space. Id. When the tumor grows, this abnormality
may create serious nerve damage. Id.

13. Fisher,325 Ga. App. at 801, 754 S.E.2d at 161. Arachnoiditis is an inflammation
of nerve membranes. STEDMAN, supra note 9, at 119. It is a different medical condition
than a schwannoma. Compareid. at 119, with id. at 1602. Notably, the spinal cord is "[a]
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explored the S1-S2-S3 level of Mr. Fisher's spine, which is directly below
the original surgical location.' 4 The neurosurgeons could not find the
schwannoma and thus explored the dura, which is the covering of the
spinal cord."' Finding no lesion in Mr. Fisher, the neurosurgeons
finished the laminectomy.16
On July 10, 2012, Mr. Fisher filed his complaint for medical malpractice against the two neurosurgeons and Atlanta Brain and Spine Care,
P.C. (collectively, the neurosurgeons). Mr. Fisher alleged in his
complaint that misdiagnosing a schwannoma instead of arachnoiditis
was negligent. He further alleged that the neurosurgeons' procedures,
including a lumbar laminectomy, durotomy, and intradural exploration,
Mr. Fisher's disabilities after the surgery were
were needless."7
5
allegedly because of the negligence of the neurosurgeons."
Mr. Fisher filed the affidavit of James Rogan, M.D. with his initial
complaint."9 Dr. Rogan believed that the neurosurgeons violated the
appropriate standard of care20 by misdiagnosing the schwannoma and

portion of the central nervous system... confined within the vertebral canal of the spinal
column." STEVEN E. PEGALIS, 3 AM. LAW MED. MALP. § 15:9 (2005). The three meningeal
membranes that encompass the brain, one of them being the arachnoid membrane, also
enclose the spinal cord. Id. In between the covering of the spinal cord, the dura, and the
actual bone, there is a space known as the "epidural space." Id. The location between the
dura and the membranes enclosing the spine, "between the arachnoid membranes and
innermost pia membrane is the [I space through which the cerebral spinal fluid flows." Id.
When the arachnoid membrane becomes inflamed, the condition is called arachnoiditis.
STEDMAN, supra note 9, at 119. Thus, this inflammation is not the same as a schwannoma,
which is a benign tumor.
14. Fisher,325 Ga. App. at 801, 754 S.E.2d at 161-62; see also STEDMAN, supra note 9,
at 1882.
15. Fisher,325 Ga. App. at 801, 754 S.E.2d at 162; see also STEDMAN, supranote 9, at
548.
16. Fisher,325 Ga. App at 801, 754 S.E.2d at 162.
17. Id. at 800, 801, 754 S.E.2d at 161, 162. In understanding Mr. Fisher's alleged
malpractice claim, note that the suspected tumor typically attaches at the bottom of the
spinal cord and pierces the membrane. LOUISE J. GORDY & ROSCOE N. GRAY, 4
ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 11.70 (3d ed. 2011). Symptoms of an intradural
tumor "include pain, difficulty walking, sensory changes, and loss of bowel and bladder
control." Id. at § 11.71. Nerve damage is a potential complication from this kind of tumor,
as is the potential that the patient could become paralyzed below the site of surgery. Id.
at § 11.73.
18. Fisher,325 Ga. App. at 801, 754 S.E.2d at 162.
19. Id.
20. The minimum standard of care for practicing medicine in Georgia was established
in 1863:
A person professing to practice surgery or the administering of medicine for
compensation must bring to the exercise of his profession a reasonable degree of
care and skill. Any injury resulting from a want of such care and skill shall be a
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by performing needless surgery. Dr. Rogan opined that the surgery,
which did not reveal an intradural tumor, caused Mr. Fisher's disabilities. Dr. Rogan's basis of knowledge regarding Mr. Fisher's procedures,
diagnosis, and treatment in this case was based on the following: (1) his
certification through the American Board of Family Practice; (2) the fact
that eighty percent, at least, of his practice involved the care of disabled
patients as well as patients with neurological disabilities; and (3) the
fact that he is familiar with the standard of care used in similar
21
cases.
In response, the neurosurgeons filed a motion to dismiss on August 9,
2012, contesting Dr. Rogan's competency in regards to the standard of
care allegedly breached by the neurosurgeons. On September 7, 2012,
Mr. Fisher filed his amended complaint with the affidavit of a different
doctor, Michael Dogali, M.D. In the new affidavit, Dr. Dogali belived
that the neurosurgeons' failure to protect Mr. Fisher's cauda equina
nerves during surgery, which led to permanent nerve damage, was
negligent. 22 Dr. Dogali's affidavit stated that he was a board-certified
neurosurgeon and that he was actively practicing neurosurgery for three
of the last five years. This active practice of neurosurgery included the
type of surgery and treatment involved in this case.23
At the hearing on the neurosurgeon's motion to dismiss, the Superior
Court of Fulton County found that Mr. Fisher did not prove Dr. Rogan's
competency.24 The court concluded that the affidavit was defective and
"that Georgia law does not authorize a plaintiff to cure such a defect by
25
filing an amended complaint with the affidavit of a different expert."
Thus, the court ruled in favor of the neurosurgeons and granted the
motion to dismiss Mr. Fisher's complaint.2 6
Mr. Fisher then appealed, and the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed
the decision.27 The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court on

tort for which a recovery may be had.
O.C.G.A_ § 51-1-27 (2000).
21. Fisher,325 Ga. App. at 801, 754 S.E.2d at 162.
22. Id. In understanding the term "cauda equina," note that the arachnoid and dural
membranes form a sleeve around the spinal cord nerve roots. PEGALIS, supra note 13, at
§ 15:9. In the lower back, the nerve roots "descend" and resemble a horse's tail. Id.
Therefore, "cauda equina is used to refer to the descending lumbosacral nerve roots." Id.
For a diagram of the different levels of the human spinal cord and an illustration of the
cauda equine, see STEDMAN, supra note 9, at 1882.
23. Fisher,325 Ga. App. at 801, 754 S.E.2d at 162.
24. Id. at 800, 754 S.E.2d at 161.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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the grounds that the cure provision does allow a plaintiff to file an
amended complaint with a substituted affidavit.2" Reconsideration was
denied on February 24, 2014, and on March 17, 2014, a petition for writ
of certiorari was fied. The Georgia Supreme Court granted the petition
on June 2, 2014, in a 4-3 vote. 29 The supreme court heard oral
arguments on September 8, 2014, and the parties filed supplemental and
response briefs shortly thereafter.30 Most recently, on October 29,
2014, an amicus brief was filed in support of Mr. Fisher.3 Specifically,
the supreme court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether a
plaintiff, after filing an incompetent expert's affidavit, is permitted to
cure this defect by32filing an amended complaint with an affidavit by a
competent expert.
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Statutory Development
Georgia has required, for many years, experts as a necessary tool to
establish the "negligent acts or omissions on the part of a professional
in malpractice actions. 3 The importance that the state places on
this expert requirement was embodied by the 1987 Georgia General
Assembly when it amended the Civil Practice Act34 to add expert
witness requirements.35 Codified as § 9.1, the statute stated that the
complaint "in any action for damages alleging professional malpractice"
must be accompanied by an expert's affidavit specifically setting forth at
36
least "one negligent act or omission" and the factual basis therefore.
The General Assembly adopted the affidavit requirement to protect
professionals from unwarranted litigation.37
A.

28. Id. at 804-05, 754 S.E.2d at 164.
29. Gala v. Fisher, No. S14G0919, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 455, at *1 (June 2, 2014).

30. Case No. S14GO919, SUPREME CT. OF GA., www.gasupreme.us/docket_search/results
_onerecord.php?caseNumber=S14G0919 (last visited Feb. 27, 2015).
31. Id.
32. Gala, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 455, at *1.
33. ADAMS, supra note 4, at § 5:2; see generally Hughes v. Malone, 146 Ga. App. 341,
345, 247 S.E.2d 107, 111 (1978).
34. Ga. H.R. Bill 6, Reg. Sess., 1966 Ga. Laws 609 (1966).
35. Ga. S. Bill 2, Reg. Sess., 1987 Ga. Laws 887, 888-89 (codified as amended at

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1).
36. Id. at 889-90; see, e.g., Hous. Auth. of Savannah v. Greene, 259 Ga. 435, 435, 383
S.E.2d 867, 867 (1989).
37. See generally REPORT, THE GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TORT REFORM 1,
6-7 (1986).
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Notably, the 1987 version of § 9.1 did not include a cure provision, but
did include complicated language and unnecessary technicalities." The
statute was amended again in 1989, but without the addition of a cure
provision.39 In interpreting the statute, appellate courts created scores
of decisions that struggled to find the appropriate response to deficient
affidavits. 40 Georgia professionals, scholars, and more importantly, the
judiciary, began to speak out against § 9.1.41 In response, the General
Assembly extensively amended the statute in 1997.42 The amendments
added an explicit cure provision, simplified § 9.1s procedures, and
maintained the spirit of its purpose: "to protect professionals from
frivolous lawsuits." 3 The legislature adopted the judicially accepted
doctrine" that a party may cure "an affidavit which is allegedly
defective.., by amendment... within 30 days of service of the motion
alleging that the affidavit is defective. '

38. See Robert D. Brussack, Georgia'sProfessionalMalpracticeAffidavit Requirement,
31 GA. L. REV. 1031, 1033-34, 1072 (1997); see also Cheeley v. Henderson, 261 Ga. 498,
502-03, 405 S.E.2d 865, 868 (1991).
39. Ga. S. Bill 329, Reg. Sess., 1989 Ga. Laws 419, 422 (codified as amended at

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1).
40. Brussack, supra note 38, at 1033.
41. See Sisk v. Patel, 217 Ga. App. 156, 159-60, 456 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1995); Cynthia
Trimboli Adams & Charles R. Adams III, Torts, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 47 MERCER
L. REV. 311, 317 (1995). In the Torts article, the authors wrote that "the expert witness
affidavit requirement of [§ 9.1] consumed a disproportionate amount ofjudicial resources."
Adams & Adams, supra, at 317 (footnote omitted); Brussack, supra note 38, at 1033-34
n.13.
42. Ga. S. Bill 276, Reg. Sess., 1997 Ga. Laws 916 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1).
43. ADAMS, supra note 4, at § 5:2; see also Bell v. Figueredo, 259 Ga. 321, 322, 381
S.E.2d 29, 30 (1989); Ga. S. Bill 276, supra note 42. The 1997 amendments also
maintained that a plaintiff is not required to prove a prima facie case allowing immediate
recovery. Bowen v. Adams, 203 Ga. App. 123, 124, 416 S.E.2d 102, 103 (1992). Another
case established, "In no sense is the pleading requirement of section 9-11-9.1 intended to
facilitate the just and efficient resolution of motions for summary judgment." Rooks v.
Tenet Health Sys. GB, Inc., 292 Ga. App. 477, 481-82, 664 S.E.2d 861, 865 (2008) (quoting
Thompson v. Ezor, 272 Ga. 849, 852, 536 S.E.2d 749, 752 (2000)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
44. Two of these judicially accepted doctrines are known as the Hewett-Washington
doctrine and the Moritz maneuver. Brussack, supranote 38, at 1035 & n.22, 1086; Hewett
v. Kalish, 264 Ga. 183, 185-86, 442 S.E.2d 233,235 (1994); Washington v. Ga. Baptist Med.
Ctr., 223 Ga. App. 762, 764, 478 S.E.2d 892, 895 (1996) ("[W]hen an affidavit has been filed
with the complaint, it can be amended to respond to challenges to its sufficiency."); Moritz
v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 215 Ga. App. 255, 256-57,450 S.E.2d 233, 234 (1994) (holding
that the plaintiff could cure by voluntarily dismissing original lawsuit then refiling it with
an affidavit before the limitations period).
45. Ga. S. Bill 276, supra note 42, at 917. The statute itself currently states:
(a) In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice against:
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(1) A professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (g) of
this Code section;
(2) A domestic or foreign partnership, corporation, professional corporation,
business trust, general partnership, limited partnership, limited liability company,
limited liability partnership, association, or any other legal entity alleged to be
liable based upon the action or inaction of a professional licensed by the State of
Georgia and listed in subsection (g) of this Code section; or
(3) Any licensed health care facility alleged to be liable based upon the action or
inaction of a health care professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed
in subsection (g) of this Code section,
the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert
competent to testify, which affidavit shall set forth specifically at least one
negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such
claim.
(b) The contemporaneous affidavit filing requirement pursuant to subsection (a)
of this Code section shall not apply to any case in which the period of limitation
will expire or there is a good faith basis to believe it will expire on any claim
stated in the complaint within ten days of the date of filing the complaint and,
because of time constraints, the plaintiff has alleged that an affidavit of an expert
could not be prepared. In such cases, if the attorney for the plaintiff files with the
complaint an affidavit in which the attorney swears or affirms that his or her law
firm was not retained by the plaintiff more than 90 days prior to the expiration
of the period of limitation on the plaintiffs claim or claims, the plaintiff shall have
45 days after the filing of the complaint to supplement the pleadings with the
affidavit. The trial court shall not extend such time for any reason without
consent of all parties. If either affidavit is not filed within the periods specified
in this Code section, or it is determined that the law firm of the attorney who filed
the affidavit permitted in lieu of the contemporaneous filing of an expert affidavit
or any attorney who appears on the pleadings was retained by the plaintiff more
than 90 days prior to the expiration of the period of limitation, the complaint shall
be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
(c) This Code section shall not be construed to extend any applicable period of
limitation, except that if the affidavits are filed within the periods specified in this
Code section, the filing of the affidavit of an expert after the expiration of the
period of limitations shall be considered timely and shall provide no basis for a
statute of limitations defense.
(d) If a complaint alleging professional malpractice is filed without the contemporaneous filing of an affidavit as permitted by subsection (b) of this Code section,
the defendant shall not be required to file an answer to the complaint until 30
days after the filing of the affidavit of an expert, and no discovery shall take place
until after the filing of the answer.
(e) If a plaintiff files an affidavit which is allegedly defective, and the defendant
to whom it pertains alleges, with specificity, by motion to dismiss filed on or before
the close of discovery, that said affidavit is defective, the plaintiffs complaint shall
be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, except that the plaintiff may
cure the alleged defect by amendment pursuant to Code Section 9-11-15 within 30
days of service of the motion alleging that the affidavit is defective. The trial
court may, in the exercise of its discretion, extend the time for filing said
amendment or response to the motion, or both, as it shall determine justice
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When applying section 9.1,46 courts should interpret the affidavit in
line with the generally liberal pleading standards of the Civil Practice
Act as long as that interpretation does not diminish § 9.1's goal of
reducing frivolous lawsuits." This generous interpretation must also

requires.
(f) If a plaintiff fails to file an affidavit as required by this Code section and the
defendant raises the failure to file such an affidavit by motion to dismiss filed
contemporaneously with its initial responsive pleading, such complaint shall not
be subject to the renewal provisions of Code Section 9-2-61 after the expiration of
the applicable period of limitation, unless a court determines that the plaintiff had
the requisite affidavit within the time required by this Code section and the
failure to file the affidavit was the result of a mistake.
(g) The professions to which this Code section shall apply are:
(1) Architects;
(2) Attorneys at law;
(3) Audiologists;
(4) Certified public accountants;
(5) Chiropractors;
(6) Clinical social workers;
(7) Dentists;
(8) Dietitians;
(9) Land surveyors;
(10) Marriage and family therapists;
(11) Medical doctors;
(12) Nurses;
(13) Occupational therapists;
(14) Optometrists;
(15) Osteopathic physicians;
(16) Pharmacists;
(17) Physical therapists;
(18) Physicians' assistants;
(19) Podiatrists;
(20) Professional counselors;
(21) Professional engineers;
(22) Psychologists;
(23) Radiological technicians;
(24) Respiratory therapists;
(25) Speech-language pathologists; or
(26) Veterinarians.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1.
46. Georgia does not require that the affidavit itself include any "magic words;" it must
simply "stateD a standard of care and a deviation" from that standard. ADAMS, supranote
4, at § 5:2; see also Fid. Enters., Inc. v. Beltran, 214 Ga. App. 205, 206, 447 S.E.2d 150,
151-52 (1994).
47. ADAMs, supranote 4, at § 5:2; see also Gadd v. Wilson & Co., 262 Ga. 234,235,416
S.E.2d 285, 286 (1992); Hutchinson v. Divorce & Custody Law Ctr. of Arline Kerman &
Assocs., 215 Ga. App. 25, 26-27, 449 S.E.2d 866, 868 (1994).
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be kept in mind when dealing with O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(c)," which
provides strict requirements for expert qualification.4 9 Thus, affidavits
should be interpreted in favor of the plaintiff despite the possibility of
an unfavorable interpretation. °
An expert is needed when a lay person would have zero knowledge,
and the expert has specialized knowledge, of the topic at issue.5 '
Common instances where expert medical knowledge is needed are
"allege[d]. . . use of inappropriate medication, wrongful administration
of medication, failure to properly assess the degree of support required
by a patient, or failure to follow medical orders."52
Tort reform measures enacted in 2005"3 affected the construction of
§ 9.1 by adding more necessary qualifications for experts in malpractice
cases.5 4 O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(cXl) provides that the expert must be
licensed in the state in which the expert was "practicing or teaching the
profession at such time."' In medical malpractice cases, experts must
have been in the active practice of their field for "at least three of the
last five years" or have taught in that field for the same amount of
time.5 6 The statute also allows for a physician to serve as an expert if,
for "at least three of the last five years," the physician has supervised

48. O.C.G.A. 24-7-702(c) (2013).
49. ADAMS, supranote 4, at § 5:2; see also Houston v. Phoebe Putney Mem Hosp., Inc.,
295 Ga. App. 674, 677, 673 S.E.2d 54, 57 (2009).
50. ADAMS, supra note 4, at § 5:2; Harris v. Murray, 233 Ga. App. 661,666, 504 S.E.2d
736, 741 (1998).

51. ADAMs, supra note 4, at § 5:2; Ga. Real Estate Appraisers Bd. v. Krouse, 299 Ga.
App. 73, 76, 681 S.E.2d 737, 741 (2009); Gen. Hosps. of Humana v. Bentley, 184 Ga. App.
489, 490-91, 361 S.E.2d 718, 719 (1987); see Walker v. Bishop, 169 Ga. App. 236, 240-41,
312 S.E.2d 349, 354 (1983); Hughes, 146 Ga. App. at 345, 247 S.E.2d at 111; Emory Univ.
v. Lee, 97 Ga. App. 680, 695-96, 104 S.E.2d 234, 246 (1958); Pilgrim v. Landham, 63 Ga.
App. 451, 454-55, 11 S.E.2d 420, 423 (1940).
52. ADAMS, supra note 4, at § 5:2 (footnotes omitted); Shirley v. Hosp. Auth. of

Valdosta/Lowndes Cnty., 263 Ga. App. 408, 409, 587 S.E.2d 873, 874 (2003); see Chandler
v. Opensided MRI of Atlanta, LLC, 299 Ga. App. 145, 145, 147, 682 S.E.2d 165, 168, 169
(2009); Holloway v. Northside Hosp., 230 Ga. App. 371, 372, 496 S.E.2d 510, 511 (1998).
A notable exception to the expert witness requirement in malpractice cases is where the
professional is being sued for an intentional tort. See Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330,
334-35, 519 S.E.2d 672, 676-77 (1999).
53. Ga. S. Bill 3, Ext. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 1.
54. See O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(c). For additional information on Georgia's 2005 tort
reform legislation, see ADAMS, supra note 4, at § 1.4.
55. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(cXl); Wilson v. McNeely, 307 Ga. App. 876, 877, 705 S.E.2d
874,876 (2011). The expert cannot be licensed in a foreign country. Cagle v. Ehirim, 304
Ga. App. 451, 451, 696 S.E.2d 438, 438 (2010); ADAMS, supra note 4, at § 5:2 n.24.
56. O.C.G.A- § 24-7-702(c)(2XA) to (B). "[This prevents a professional of less than three
years' standing from testifying as his own expert witness." ADAMS, supra note 4, at § 5:2
n.33.
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certain enumerated medical professionals and has knowledge of their
standards of care.5 7
To add to the complexity of expert requirements, Georgia also adopted
the Daubert standard as a part of its 2005 tort reform legislation.5
O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702"9 adopts an expanded procedure allowing a party
to move the court to hold a hearing "no later than the final pretrial
conference," and directs courts to federal cases, such as Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,6 ° for appropriate interpretive
standards.6 1 The Daubert test and the allowance of extensive pretrial
hearings provide more hoops for litigants to jump through in terms of
qualifying their experts.6 2 This is relevant to § 9.1's expert affiant
requirement because it is increasingly difficult to find a competent
expert under Georgia's heightened standards.63
B.

Mechanics
In filing a malpractice suit, plaintiffs' attorneys must abide by the
time frame set out by § 9. 1.64 Subsection (b) explains that "the
contemporaneous affidavit filing requirement [governed by] subsection
(a) [will] not apply to any case in which the period of limitation will
expire .. .within ten days [after the plaintiff! file[s] the complaint." 5
Under the same subsection, there is an option for the plaintiff to receive
a forty-five day grace period "to supplement the pleadings with the
affidavit. 6 This can only happen if "there is a good faith basis to
believe [the period of limitation] will expire," and it is clear the plaintiff
could not "prepare" an expert because the attorneys were not retained
"more than ninety days prior" to the date of expiration. 7 With that
being said, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim if
the affidavit is not filed within the periods set out by § 9.1 and it is
57. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(c)(2XD). This applies to "nurses, nurse practitioners, certified
registered nurse anesthetists, nurse midwives, physician assistants, physical therapists,
occupational therapists, or medical support staff." Id.; ADAMS, supra note 4, at § 5:2.
58. ADAMS, supra note 4, at § 1:4.

59. O.C.G.A. 24-7-702 (2013).
60. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
61. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(d), (f);
see also 509 U.S. 579, 585-601; ADAMS, supra note 4, at
§ 1:4.
62. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-601 (discussing at great length the newly adopted
standards for determining the admissibility of scientific expert testimony); ADAMS, supra
note 4, at § 1:4.
63. See O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(c).
64.

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(b)-(f).

65. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(b).
66.

Id.; Brussack, supra note 38, at 1065-66 (discussing § 9.1's "grace period").

67. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(b); ADAMS, supra note 4, at § 5:2.
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determined that the plaintiff's attorney was retained within the
68
appropriate ninety-day window before the statute of limitations runs.
When filing an answer, the defendant does not have to answer "until
thirty days after the filing of the affidavit of an expert" if the plaintiff
filed the "complaint ... without the contemporaneous filing of an
69
Subsection (d) further
affidavit as permitted by subsection (b)."
outlines that no discovery between the two parties is allowed until after
7
the defendant fies an answer.
To challenge the sufficiency of an affidavit, the defendant may file a
motion to dismiss before discovery ends alleging with specificity why the
affidavit is defective.7 ' Consequently, "the plaintiff's complaint shall
72
be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim." However, under
the amended provisions of § 9.1, "the plaintiff may cure the alleged
defect by amendment pursuant to Code Section 9-11-15 within 30
days."73 All expert witness affidavit amendments must comply with
74
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15, which governs amendments on the pleadings.
The trial court has discretion in determining whether to extend the time
75
of filing such an amendment. Once a plaintiff fails to file an affidavit
altogether, their only option "is to voluntarily dismiss the complaint
"
before the trial court grants the motion to dismiss. 76 This way, the
77
Alplaintiff "avoid[s] a decision on the merits of the complaint."
though plaintiffs cannot cure the failure to file an affidavit, courts do
allow plaintiffs "to amend the complaint as a matter of right any time
78
prior to the entry of a pretrial order."

68. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(f); see generally Atlanta Women's Health Grp., P.C. v. Clemons,
299 Ga. App. 102, 105, 681 S.E.2d 754, 757 (2009); Peck v. Bishop, 294 Ga. App. 132, 133-

34, 668 S. E.2d 558, 559-60 (2008).
69. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(d).
70. Id.
71.
72.

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(e); ADAMS, supra note 4, at § 5:2.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(e).

73. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15 (2014).
74. See O.C.GA. § 9-11-9.1(e); O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15.
75. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(e); Schofill v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 315 Ga. App.
817,820,728 S.E.2d 331,333 (2012); Piscitelli v. Hosp. Auth. ofValdosta & Lowndes Cnty.,
302 Ga. App. 746, 748, 691 S.E.2d 615, 617 (2010).
76. 15 GA. JUR. § 36:21 (2013); see also Roberson v. Northrup, 302 Ga. App. 405, 407,
691 S.E.2d 547, 549 (2010).
77. 15 GA. JUR., supra note 76, at § 36:21.
78. Id.; see also Shuler v. Hicks, Massey & Gardner, LLP, 280 Ga. App. 738, 740, 634
S.E.2d 786, 788 (2006).
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JudicialApplication
In the 1997 case Porquez v. Washington,79 Justice Hines stated that
the recent amendments to § 9.1 maintained the spirit of the General
Assembly by allowing plaintiffs to amend a defective affidavit.' When
an expert affidavit is initially filed with the medical malpractice
complaint, a plaintiff is allowed to amend their affidavit if its sufficiency
is disputed."1 Justice Hines concluded that "[plermitting the plaintiff
to amend the expert affidavit in order to meet the requirement that it
set forth at least one claimed negligent act or omission by each
defendant and its factual basis [did] not defeat the purpose of the
statute."8 2 Instead, that allowance helped "to insure that the complaint
is not frivolous.'
In Bhansali v. Moncada," the defendants argued that the denial of
their motion to dismiss was in error due to the late filing of the
plaintiff's expert affidavit. 85 The court of appeals adopted the trial
court's reasoning, which relied on the Porquez analysis: as long as expert
affidavit is filed with the initial complaint, § 9.1 allows a plaintiff to
amend their complaint by substitution with a new affidavit.w Because
the plaintiff had filed an affidavit with the complaint, the court of
appeals held that the denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss under
§ 9.1 was correct because, as of the 1997 amendment, subsection (e)
blocks plaintiffs from amendment only when no affidavit is filed with the
original complaint.8 7
In Piscitelli v. HospitalAuthority of Valdosta & Lowndes County,'
the plaintiff amended her original affidavit within thirty days after the
defendant's amended motioned for dismissal alleging the affidavit's
defects, specifically the expert's incompetency. The plaintiff attached an
additional affidavit by another medical professional to her amended
complaint that discussed the alleged breaches in the defendant's
standard of care. 9 The trial court granted the defendant's amended

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

268 Ga. 649, 492 S.E.2d 665 (1997).
Id. at 652, 492 S.E.2d at 668.
Id. at 651, 492 S.E.2d at 667-68.
Id. at 652, 492 S.E.2d at 668.
Id.
275 Ga. App. 221, 620 S.E.2d 404 (2005).
Id. at 226, 620 S.E.2d at 408.
Id. at 227, 620 S.E.2d at 409.
Id. at 226-28, 620 S.E.2d at 408-10.
302 Ga. App. 746, 691 S.E.2d 615 (2010).
Id. at 747-48, 691 S.E.2d at 616.
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9°
motion to dismiss under § 9.1, but the court of appeals reversed.
Although the court of appeals declined to decide whether the original
expert was incompetent, it concluded that the additional affidavit was
91
not defective and was filed in a timely manner. The court of appeals
held that dismissal of the action based solely on the original affiant's
competency was in error.9 2 Thus, the court allowed the consideration
93
of an additional expert affidavit filed by amendment.

IV. COURTS RATIONALE
The Foundation
In Fisher v. Gala, the superior court had ruled that when a plaintiff
files an incompetent expert's affidavit contemporaneously with their
complaint, § 9. 1's cure provision does not allow the plaintiff to substitute
that affidavit with a competent expert's affidavit. The Georgia Court
of Appeals reviewed the case de novo, viewing "the pleadings in the light
5
most favorable to Fisher, resolving any doubts in his favor."
The court of appeals examined § 9.1(a), which required Fisher to file
96 This affidavit had
his complaint with an expert affidavit attached.
to set forth "specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to
7
exist and the factual basis for each such claim." Fisher had to abide
by that statutory requirement because his complaint raised a negligence
claim dealing with professional malpractice against doctors and a
licensed health care facility.9" When Fisher fied his complaint, former
O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.199 established the standard for determining an

A.

90. Id. at 753, 691 S.E.2d at 619-20.
91. Id. at 752-53, 691 S.E.2d at 619-20.
92. Id. at 753, 691 S.E.2d at 619-20.
93. Id. at 748-49, 752-53, 691 S.E.2d at 617, 619-20.
94. Fisher, 325 Ga. App. at 801-02, 754 S.E.2d at 162.
95. Id. at 802, 754 S.E.2d at 162.
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(a)).
98. Id.
99. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 (2010) (repealed 2013). In 2013, amendments to the Georgia
Evidence Code, title 24 of the O.C.GA., took effect. John E. Hall, Jr., et al., Evidence,
Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 66 MERCER L. REV. 81, 81 (2014). As part of these
amendments, O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702, replaced O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1. See Fisher,325 Ga. App.
at 802 n.3, 754 S.E.2d at 162 n.3. Nevertheless, O.C.GA. § 24-7-702 "contains the same
standard for determining an expert's competence to testify as former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1."
Id.
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expert's competence to testify and § 9.1 established the standard for
expert affidavits."'
The court of appeals agreed with the neurosurgeons' argument that
Dr. Rogan, the original expert, was incompetent to testify regarding the
standard of neurological care at issue in Mr. Fisher's case.10 ' The
court then investigated the nuances of Georgia's procedural requirements when filing a medical malpractice complaint in terms of the
required expert affidavit.0 2 Once a plaintiff files the § 9.1 affidavit
with the complaint, the defendant can allege that the expert affidavit is
defective. 10 3 Under this provision, the court further noted that dismissal is warranted only if the motion identifies how the affidavit is
defective and the plaintiff does not act within the thirty-day period to fix
the deficiencies.'
B.

Analysis

The court analogized Mr. Fisher's case to the facts in Piscitelli v.
Hospital Authority of Valdosta and Lowndes County because in both
cases, after the plaintiff amended the complaint and filed the affidavit
of the new expert, the defendant did not challenge the new afflant's
competency to testify. 10 5 Thus, the court did not reevaluate the new
affiant's satisfaction of § 9.1s pleading requirement. 16 In doing so,
the court weighed the importance of the broad pleading standard under
the Georgia Civil Practice Act while maintaining the gatekeeping
function of § 9.1.107 The court reasoned, under the analysis utilized in
Porquez v. Washington, that allowing a plaintiff the ability to cure a
defective affidavit by amendment "does not defeat the purpose of the
statute, but instead helps to insure that the complaint is not frivolous." 108 Because Fisher utilized the cure provision of § 9.1, and the

100. Fisher,325 Ga. App. at 802, 754 S.E.2d at 162.
101. Id. at 803, 754 S.E.2d at 163.
102. Id.
103. Id. The code states that if the defendant can
allege[] with specificity, by motion to dismiss filed on or before the close of

discovery, that said affidavit isdefective, the plaintiffs complaint shall be subject

to dismissal for failure to state a claim, except that the plaintiff may cure the

alleged defect by amendment pursuant to Code Section 9-11-15 within 30 days
of service of the motion alleging that the affidavit is defective.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (e)).
104. Id. at 803, 754 S.E.2d at 163.
105. Id. at 804, 754 S.E.2d at 163-64; see alsoPiscitelli, 302 Ga. App. at 753, 691 S.E.2d
at 619.
106. Fisher,325 Ga. App. at 804-05, 754 S.E.2d at 164.
107. Id.
108. Id. (quoting Porquez, 268 Ga. at 652, 492 S.E.2d at 668).
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defendants did not challenge the new expert's affidavit, the court held
The court ruled that Dr.
that the purpose of § 9.1 was satisfied.'
Dogali's expert affidavit should not have been ignored, and the dismissal
of the action because of the insufficiency of Dr. Rogan's affidavit was in
error." Consequently, the court reversed the judgment."'
V.

IMPLICATIONS

To understanding the implications of Fisherv.Gala and its interpretation of § 9.1(e), a hearkening back to the purpose of the statute is
necessary. Section 9.1 serves as a guard against frivolous lawsuits, but
as Fisher affirms, it is not intended "to serve as a tactical tool for
defense counsel."1 2 Fisher'sholding embodies the legislative intent of
the 1997 amendments to § 9.1. As Porquez established, the plaintiff's
ability to amend its expert affidavit does not defeat the purpose of the
Subsection (e) effectively
statute, but helps ensure valid lawsuits.'
maintains the intended gatekeeping function by maintaining the
parameter of thirty days but will not preclude a plaintiff from relief on
the basis of technicalities." 4 The court of appeals accurately held that
where a plaintiff files his complaint with an affidavit by a person not
competent to testify as an expert in the action, subsection (e) permits the
plaintiff to cure this defect by filing an amended complaint with an
115 The Georgia Supreme Court will
affidavit by a competent expert.
likely hold the same, as "neither statutes nor case law" advocate the
barring of a plaintiff's ability to cure defects by substituting an expert's
affidavit.

16

Generally, the Civil Practice Act provides for liberality in pleading."' Section 9.1 functions as a gatekeeper in medical malpractice
litigation as it requires the plaintiff to attach an expert affidavit1 alleging
the negligence on the part of the defendant to the complaint. ' This

109. Id. at 805, 754 S.E.2d at 164.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 805, 754 S.E.2d at 165.
112. Bonner v. Peterson, 301 Ga. App. 443, 447, 687 S.E.2d 676, 681 (2009); see also
Fisher,325 Ga. App. at 804-05, 754 S.E.2d at 164.
113. Porquez, 268 Ga. at 652, 492 S.E.2d at 668.
114. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(e); see also Ndlovu v. Pham, 314 Ga. App. 337,342-43,723
S.E.2d 729, 732-33.
115. Fisher, 325 Ga. App. at 804-05, 754 S.E.2d at 164.
116. Brief of Appellees, Gala v. Fisher, No. S14G0919 (Ga. argued Sept. 8, 2014), 2014
Ga. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 263, at *16-18.
117. See Brake v. Mintz, 193 Ga. App. 662, 666, 388 S.E.2d 715, 719 (1989).
118. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1.
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reduces the number of frivolous malpractice suits. 9 Decreasing the
amount of invalid malpractice suits is the primary goal of § 9.1; however,
the plaintiff is not required to show a prima facie case to defeat a motion
for summary judgment. 120
This standard bars frivolous lawsuits
because "it requires plaintiffs to find an expert who will attest that at
121
least one act of professional negligence has occurred."
When an affidavit has been amended or substituted, plaintiffs must
be given every chance to meet the standard of§ 9.1, which complies with
the breadth of the Civil Practice Act.122 The court of appeals has
emphasized that even when there is the possibility of an "unfavorable
construction," favorable interpretation of the plaintiff's affidavits is

necessary, "with all doubts resolved in [the] plaintiff's favor.""2
Although the § 9.1 affidavit is an exception to the general liberality
utilized in pleadings, the rule must be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the Civil Practice Act and in conjunction with the expert

requirements set by O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702.124 Fisher maintains this
balance. The plaintiff followed the § 9.1 requirements by filing an
original affidavit contemporaneously with the complaint and followed the
12 5
cure provision under subsection (e).
The Georgia code establishes a broad definition for medical malpractice actions.' 26 This broad definition, in conjunction with the second
chance for plaintiff's under subsection (e), may leave plaintiffs a latitude

119. Porquez, 268 Ga. at 652, 492 S.E.2d at 668.
120. Bowen, 203 Ga. App. at 124, 416 S.E.2d 103; 0-1 Doctors Mem'l Holding Co. v.
Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 288, 378 S.E.2d 708, 710 (1989).
121. Walker v. Cromartie, 287 Ga. 511, 512, 696 S.E.2d 654, 657 (2010).
122. Phoebe Putney Mem'l Hosp., 235 Ga. App. at 534-35, 510 S.E.2d at 103.
123. Id.; see Porquez, 268 Ga. at 650, 492 S.E.2d at 667; Hewett, 264 Ga. at 184, 442
S.E.2d at 234.
124. See Houston, 295 Ga. App. 678-79,673 S.E.2d at 58 (holding that the affidavit met
the statutory requirement after resolving all doubts in the plaintiff's favor).
125. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15; Fisher,325 Ga. App. at 804-05,754 S.E.2d
at 164-65.
126. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-70 (2007); O.C.G. § 9-11-8(a) (2014). The code defines medical
malpractice as
any claim for damages resulting from the death of or injury to any person arising
out of:
(A) Health, medical, dental, or surgical service, diagnosis, prescription,
treatment, or care rendered by a person authorized by law to perform such
services or by any person acting under the supervision and control of a lawfully
authorized person; or
(B) Care or service rendered by any public or private hospital, nursing home,
clinic, hospital authority, facility, or institution, or by any officer, agent, or
employee thereof acting within the scope of his employment.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(aXl).
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for claims that is too wide. From a policy standpoint, the lack of
restriction on medical malpractice litigation may open the floodgates for
malpractice claims against healthcare providers. Although this is a
valid concern, § 9.1 still serves its gatekeeping function through the
same subsection that allows plaintiffs to amend because plaintiffs still
27
must amend within thirty days or their claims will be dismissed.
Therefore, thirty-one days after the pleadings, the defense wins if the
128
plaintiff cannot find a competent expert.
In the appeal of Fisher currently under consideration by the supreme
court, the appellants argue that allowing the plaintiff to amend with an
additional affidavit "gut[s] the contemporaneous filing requirement of
[§ 9.1(a)]. " 129 They further argue that in 2005, the General Assembly
amended § 9.1 as a part of its effort to address a crisis in the quality of
health care services in Georgia. 13 ° Allowing plaintiffs to substitute
3
new affidavits does away with § 9.1's gatekeeping function.' ' This
would allow practically any person to serve as an expert to meet the
contemporaneous filing requirement, and thus frivolous claims would be
easier to file. 3 2
Fisheris indeed a plaintiff-friendly decision, and it is in line with the
Georgia General Assembly's intent. After the cure provision was
initially added in 1997,1'3 § 9.1 was amended again in 2005,'3"
2006135 and 2007.136 Significantly, the General Assembly did not
alter the subsection (e) provision and maintained plaintiffs' broad right
to cure.' 37 It is up to the General Assembly to change the language of
38
§ 9.1 if so desired, and they have not.' It is clear that a substituted
affidavit constitutes a valid amendment.
Georgia's expert affidavit statute does not just apply to medical
malpractice but many areas of professional malpractice. The 1997
amendments codified who qualifies as a professional in the state of
127. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(e).
128. See Brief of Appellants, Gala v. Fisher, No. S14G0919 (Ga. argued Sept. 8,2014),
2014 Ga. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 262, at *7.
129. Id. at *14.
130. Id. at *16; see also Ga. S. Bill 3, supra note 53, at 1.
131. Gala, 2014 Ga. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 262, at *17.
132. Id.
133. Ga. S. Bill 276, supra note 42, at 916-17.
134. Ga. S. Bill 3, supra note 53, at 3-4. "The 2005 amendment eliminated the 45-day
grace period altogether," but the 2007 amendments restored it. Peck, 294 Ga. App. at 133,
668 S.E.2d at 559.
135. Ga. S. Bill 465, Ext. Sess., 2006 Ga. Laws 72, 73.
136. Ga. H. Bill 221, Reg. Sess., 2007 Ga. Laws 216, 217-19.
137. Brief of Appellees, supra note 116, at *2-3.
138. Id. at *10.
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Georgia. 139 The current list of twenty-six types of professionals1 40 is
a narrower list than those originally protected under former versions of
§ 9.1-common-law professionals."' The twenty-six enumerated types
of professionals are all affected by Fisher because of the lessened
protection they receive as the result of plaintiffs' judicially affirmed
ability to cure their affidavits by amendment.
Georgia is not alone in its attempt to limit frivolous lawsuits through
expert opinion in medical malpractice cases. 142 Many states either
have medical malpractice panels or have enacted "certificate of merit"
46
Michigan, 147
Florida, 4 5 Maryland,
Arizona,'"
statutes. 143
Minnesota, 14 North Dakota, 1 49 and West Virginia 5 ° are among the
many states with these requirements in medical malpractice cases.
Florida, for example, requires a pre-suit corroborating medical opinion
in medical malpractice claims. 1 The medical opinion must come from
a medical professional with relevant experience about the subject upon
which he or she is asked to give an opinion. 5 2 If the plaintiff's
complaint is filed without the appropriate corroborating expert opinion,
the defendant can move to dismiss.'53 Like Georgia, Florida's statutory requirement that plaintiffs obtain an expert's corroborating opinion

139. Ga. S. Bill 276, supra note 42, at 918.
140. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(g).
141. See generally Housing Auth. of Savannah, 259 Ga. at 436, 383 S.E.2d at 868
(applying professional malpractice principles to "persons performing architectural and
engineering services").

142. See Fort Walton Beach Med. Ctr. v. Dingler, 697 So. 2d 575, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997).

143. See STEVEN E. PEGALIS, 2 AM. LAW MED. MALP. 3d § 9:1 (2005 & Supp. 2014).
144. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2603 (Supp. 2006); Gorney v. Meaney, 150 P.3d 799,
801-02 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).

145. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.203 (West 2011); OHanrahan v. Moore, 731 So. 2d 95,96-97
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
146. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04 (LexisNexis 2006); Carroll v.
Konits, 929 A.2d 19, 26 (Md. 2007).

147. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2169 (West 2010); Bates v. Gilbert, 736 N.W.2d
566, 570 (Mich. 2007).
148. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682 (West 2005); Stroud v. Hennepin Cnty. Med. Ctr., 556
N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1996).

149. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (2006); Weasel v. St. Alexius Med. Ctr., 230 F.3d
348, 350-51 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying North Dakota law).
150. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6 (LexisNexis 2008); see Blankenship v. Ethicon, Inc.,
656 S.E.2d 451, 453 (W. Va. 2007).
151. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.203(4); see Yocom v. Wuesthoff Health Sys., 880 So. 2d 787,
788, 790 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
152. Yocom, 880 So. 2d at 790.
153. Archer v. Maddux, 645 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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54
in a malpractice suit is designed to stop "baseless litigation."'
Florida and Georgia, like many other states, share the same policy
concerns.
In dealing with a plaintiffs right to cure an expert opinion after the
filing of a complaint, there is only one relevant out-of-state decision. In
Cookson v. Price,155 the Illinois Appellate Court upheld the plaintiff's
amended complaint."5 6 In its analysis, the court decided that allowing
the plaintiff to amend his complaint furthered the purpose of Illinois's
157
malpractice statue because his allegations were not frivolous.
Georgia shares the same policy concerns that states are grappling with
nationwide in the realm of medical malpractice. As Illinois and Georgia
have now established, a plaintiff's ability to cure an expert opinion by
amendment does not allow frivolous claims, but instead ensures their
merit. In 1997, Robert Brussack accurately predicted that if an affiant
is not in fact competent, the shortcoming could be cured by amendment
because the affidavit would be "considered a defective affidavit rather
than no affidavit at all."5 ' Brussack notes that the ability to amend
who counts
is important because "it is all too easy to be wrong about
159
expert.
competent
testimonially
a
under Georgia law as
Fisher v. Gala is important because it maintained the spirit of § 9.1's
1997 amendments, which codified Georgia's judicially adopted cure
provision. 6 ° In cases like Mr. Fisher's, where claims are not frivolous,
and thus not the type that the statute was intended to weed out,
subsection (e) of § 9.1 allows plaintiffs to obtain meaningful recovery.
Overall, the purpose of § 9.1 is to ensure that malpractice cases do not
go to discovery and onward without real, legitimate experts on the
plaintiff's side. Georgia wants a competent expert early on in the case.
Fisher v. Gala serves as a message to plaintiffs in the state of Georgia:
If your first expert affiant is found incompetent, amend and try again
with a different one. However, subsection (e)'s cure provision will not
open the floodgates of frivolous litigation - plaintiffs still must abide by
the thirty day limitation as outlined by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-15.

154. Apostolico v. Orlando Reg'l Health Care Sys., 871 So. 2d 283, 286 n.3 (Fla. Dist.

Ct. App. 2004); Cent. State Reg'l Hosp. v. Hill, 721 So. 2d 404, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (per curiam); Fort Walton Beach Med. Ctr., 697 So. 2d at 579; see also Kukral v.

Mekras, 679 So. 2d 278, 284 (Fla.1996); Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics v. Barber, 638
So. 2d 570, 572 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

App. Ct. 2009).
914 N.E.2d 229 (Ill.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 232-33.
Brussack, supra note 38, at 1058.
Id.
See O.C.GA. 9-11-9.1(e).
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"If at first you don't succeed, try, try again. Then quit. There's no
point in being a damn fool about it."
W.C. Fields6 '
KATHRYN S. DUNNAM

161. BOB FENSTER, LAUGH OFF: THE COMEDY SHOWDOWN BETWEEN REAL LIFE AND
THE PROS 90 (2005).

